The 'Beeching Axe' and Electoral Support in Britain by Quiroz Flores, A & Whiteley, P
	1	
	
 
 
 
The ‘Beeching Axe’ and Electoral Support in Britain1  
 
Alejandro Quiroz Flores and Paul Whiteley 
aquiro@essex.ac.uk; whiteley@essex.ac.uk 
Department of Government 
University of Essex 
Wivenhoe Park 
Colchester 
CO4 3SQ 
Corresponding Author: Alejandro Quiroz Flores 
 
Abstract 
Policy implementation has important electoral effects, but there is often a problem in 
determining if policy changes drive electoral behaviour or if the process works in reverse.  To 
address this issue we exploit a unique natural experiment in Britain: the closure of thousands 
of train stations, known as the Beeching Cuts, on the eve of General Election of 1964. We use 
several statistical methods to show that policy implementation was unaffected by partisan 
considerations and therefore it can be regarded as an exogenous intervention.  An individual 
level model of voting intentions from the first British Election Study conducted in 1963, and 
an aggregate model of party vote shares in the General Election of 1964 show that the 
closures significantly changed voting support for the Conservative party.  The 1964 election 
was very competitive and the closures clearly contributed to the defeat of the incumbent 
government after 13 years of uninterrupted rule.  
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Introduction 
Public policies have electoral effects; for example, there is a wealth of research on economic 
voting which indicates that voters reward incumbent governments for economic prosperity 
and punish them for economic failure (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Van 
der Brug et al., 2007; Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Whiteley et al., 2013).  In Britain this 
research goes back a long way (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970; Miller and Mackie, 1973).  
More recent work shows that public service delivery in relation to issues such as health, 
education and transport, together with lower rates of crime and personal insecurity also bring 
electoral rewards (Stokes, 1963, 1992; Clarke et al. 2004, 2009).  These policy outcomes 
have effects both across time and across space (Johnston, Pattie, and Allsop, 1988; Pattie, 
Seyd, and Whiteley, 2004).  
 In common with research in social science, however, there is a problem identifying if 
variations in policy delivery drive electoral support, or if the process works in reverse, with 
anticipated electoral effects driving policy-making.  In this paper we examine a policy with a 
significant geographical impact on transport in Britain in the 1960s, the Beeching Axe of the 
railway network. In this one-off event, thousands of train stations across the country were 
permanently closed in order to reduce the massive operating losses of the dilapidated 
network. The closures took place on the eve of the highly competitive General Election of 
1964, and thus present us with a unique opportunity to identify the effect of exogenous 
policy-making on voting behaviour. Specifically, we show that policies which are not 
normally very salient in influencing voting behaviour nonetheless have electoral effects, and 
as we demonstrate below the flow of causation runs one way.  
 We challenge anecdotal evidence that suggests that the infamous cuts of 1963-1964 
were uniformly disliked and suggest that they were in fact a spatial or divisive issue in 
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electoral politics (Downs, 1957).  As we point out below, spatial issues are those which 
divide the electorate and citizens support a party which comes closest to their own 
preferences on these issues.  At the same time the cuts were also a valence issue for those 
who were directly affected by the policy.  Valence issues are those over which there is 
widespread agreement about what should be done, but divisions arise over which party is best 
at delivering policy goals (Stokes, 1963). In constituencies where the cuts took place, electors 
were losing a local public service making it more of a valence issue for them and so many 
sought to punish the government that had taken away this service.  
We develop three distinct hypotheses based on these ideas and test them using the 
first British Election Study (BES) survey conducted in 1963 (Butler and Stokes, 1969); this is 
the only wave in the history of the BES that explored this policy issue. Moreover, we 
matched the BES data with a new database of the geographical location of 1,220 station 
closures in England and Wales to identify BES respondents directly affected by the cuts in 
order to model voting behaviour in the 1964 election.  We find that the station closures 
produced a loss of political support for the Conservative government. The effects are 
subsequently confirmed with an aggregate analysis of constituency voting across Britain 
showing that the vote share of the Conservatives was reduced by the Beeching Axe.  Since the 
1964 General Election was highly competitive —the 1964 election gave Labour 317 seats, 
only 13 more seats than the Conservatives obtained— we argue that the Beeching Cuts made 
a decisive contribution to the defeat of the incumbent government, which was replaced by a 
Labour government after 13 years of uninterrupted rule. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first present an overview of the Beeching Axe. 
Although this is a policy that has produced controversy for the last 50 years in Britain, it is 
surprisingly not well understood. The paper then presents a theoretical framework and moves 
on to discuss the empirical strategy. There we present estimation results for two classes of 
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models: the first set explores voting intentions in 1963 while the second set investigates party 
vote share in the General Election of 1964. We conclude with a brief discussion on the 
unique character of the station closures and their role in identifying voting behaviour on the 
eve of competitive elections. 
The Beeching Axe and the British General Election of 1964 
In the early 1960s, the Conservative government commissioned a report on the state of the 
national rail network. The network was already in a poor condition in the early 1950s after 
years of under-investment and a Modernization Plan of 1954-1955 was supposed to renovate 
it. However, the commissioned report, entitled The Reshaping of British Railways (British 
Railways Board, 1963), concluded that the most serious problem for the network was not 
renovation but rather operating losses, which in 1961 amounted to £86.9 million pounds, 
equivalent to £1.7 billion pounds at current prices. The Report, popularly known as the 
Beeching Report, after Dr. Richard Beeching, Chairman of the British Railways Board, traced 
the cause of the financial losses to the limited use of many stations. An analysis of receipts 
demonstrated that approximately 3,500 stations contributed two per cent of the network’s 
income while 34 stations accounted for 26 per cent of the income (British Railways Board, 
1963, p. 11).  
 In order to reshape the network, the Report proposed a plan that consisted of 15 steps, 
including the closure of two thirds of stations across Great Britain. Specifically, “The number 
of stations and halts which will be closed is 2,363, including 435 under consideration before 
the Report appeared.  Of these, 235 have already been closed. Services will be completely 
withdrawn from about 5,000 route miles.” (British Railways Board, 1963, p. 97). Figure 1 
presents a map of the closures across England and Wales.1  
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Figure 1: Stations Closed in England and Wales. 
 
According to Patmore (1965), there were three different types of lines affected by the 
cuts. First, there were rural branches no longer feeding traffic to the main lines and these had 
been losing money since they were first laid down. The second type of closures affected 
routes that were feeding stagnant regions whose traffic had changed considerably. Finally, the 
cuts ended duplicate stations produced by competition between railway companies before 
Figure 1: Stations Closed in England and Wales
Note: For data reference, please see Endnote 2.
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nationalisation had occurred. Other cuts affected halts and stations that served private estates 
or even stops that served pubs such as Trouble House Halt. 
The large majority of the closures took place just months before the General Election 
of 1964, which gave little time to Conservative incumbents to ameliorate the consequences of 
the closures at the local level before voters turned to the polls. Never again did the British 
public witness such an enormous change to the national rail network, and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the closures were widely disliked. Nevertheless, the British Election Study of 
1963 indicates that a significant proportion of voters did support the policy.  What explains 
the voters’ mixed feelings about the policy? To what extent did these feelings have an effect 
on voting intentions? These are key questions because the closures took place just months 
before the very competitive General Election of 1964. By the time the votes were counted, 
Labour claimed 44.1 per cent of the votes while the Conservatives’ share was 43.4 per cent; 
the conservative share of the vote had fallen by six per cent, its largest drop since 1945 
(Butler and King, 1965).  
 The answers to these questions cannot be separated from the political climate of the 
time.  To begin with, the Conservatives had experienced falling popularity for a number of 
reasons (Butler and King, 1965), including an unpopular wage freeze introduced in 1961 and 
a sluggish economy. By 1962-1963, the Conservatives were haemorrhaging parliamentary 
seats in by-elections. Two events further contributed to the decline of Conservative 
popularity: the Profumo affair and the abolition of Resale Price Maintenance.  
The Profumo affair is relatively well known; John Profumo, the Defence minister in 
the Conservative government, denied rumours in the press that he was having an affair with a 
young model, Christine Keeler, to the House of Commons. He subsequently admitted the 
relationship in the House and so had to resign.  This was a major scandal because Ms. Keeler 
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was also in a relationship with Yvegeny Ivanov, the Soviet naval attaché at the time, thereby 
opening up the minister to blackmail.  For a full discussion of this scandal see Parris (1996). 
The scandal weakened the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who resigned due to ill health 
soon after.  Macmillan was replaced by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, an aristocrat who was 
viewed as an outdated Victorian figure by many people, and the Labour leader Harold Wilson 
used this to full advantage.  Wilson ran a very effective election campaign in 1964 
emphasizing the importance of science and technology in modernizing Britain and calling for 
the removal of outdated attitudes and practices (Butler and King, 1965).   
 The abolition of Resale Prime Maintenance (RPM) further weakened the 
Conservative party. The policy effectively eliminated price competition by preventing 
supermarkets from buying products at discounted rates from producers and selling them at 
lower prices. The abolition was designed to increase market competition in the High street 
and to benefit consumers at the expense of small retailers, many of whom were Conservative 
party supporters. According to Findley (2001), the Conservative government’s success in 
abolishing this policy  “succeeded in splitting the party, upsetting a large section of 
Conservative support, and delaying the date of the general election. Because of it, the Prime 
Minister had lost his most important electoral advantage: the ability to choose a date which 
best suits him and which wrong-foots his opponents. This was to have a crucial effect upon 
the electoral fortunes of the Conservative party in 1964.” 
Theoretical Framework: Modelling the Effects of the Beeching Axe 
To model the effects of the railway closures on voting behaviour we need to anchor the 
analysis in the context of well-defined models of electoral choice.  The two dominant models 
in the literature are the spatial model, originally associated with the work of Downs (1957; 
see also Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Adams et al., 2005), and the 
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valence model introduced by Donald Stokes (Stokes, 1963, 1992; see also Clarke et al., 2004, 
2009; Whiteley et al., 2013).  The spatial model has been elaborated in different ways but 
retains the core assumption that position issues which involve disagreements among the 
voters over policy goals are the key factor which explains electoral choice.  Here, voters’ 
preferences over divisive issues are taken as a given because the theory inherited the 
assumption that tastes, or in this case policy objectives, are determined exogenously by 
outside factors, a legacy from neo-classical economics (Hotelling, 1929; Blaug, 1962).  In 
fact experimental evidence suggests that this is a poor representation of reality but it is 
nonetheless the standard assumption in spatial modelling (see Sanders et al., 2011). As we 
shall see below the Beeching Axe was a salient position issue at the time since the voters 
were divided over the necessity for the cuts.   
 As mentioned above, the valence model in contrast focuses on issues over which 
there is widespread agreement on policy goals among both parties and voters.  In this case 
disagreements occur over which party is best able to deliver on these agreed objectives. The 
most important valence issue is the economy, since almost everyone wants vigorous, 
sustainable economic growth coupled with low rates of unemployment and inflation and there 
is little support for stagnation and unemployment.  The quality of public services such as 
health, education and transport are also valence issues, with individuals preferring high 
quality to low quality services.  Given this, the key idea is that the electorate will support a 
party or a government which appears most likely to deliver these policies.  
 Valence theory can be viewed as a generalisation of economic voting and assumes 
that policy delivery influences attitudes to issues.  Successful delivery of services valued by 
voters will strengthen their support for a party or leader, and unsuccessful delivery will have 
the opposite effect.  This means that support for the ruling Conservative party is likely to be 
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reduced if voters are personally affected by station closures and the Labour and Liberal 
parties could benefit from this by acquiring extra support.  
In the present context, we argue that public attitudes to the closure programme was a 
spatial issue, since the evidence shows it divided the public in 1963.  The first ever British 
Election Study survey of that year asked interviewees if they had heard of the Beeching plan 
and some 90 per cent indicated that they had.  Some 46 per cent of them supported the 
planned cuts with 35 per cent opposed and the remaining 19 per cent having mixed views or 
not knowing.  This meant that the policy was far from being universally disliked by voters.  
Two subsequent open ended questions asked respondents to indicate the advantages and 
disadvantages of the planned cuts as they saw them.  Some 43 per cent of respondents living 
in constituencies unaffected by the cuts had positive things to say about the policy, compared 
with only 39 per cent in constituencies affected.  This indicates, not surprisingly, that 
individuals affected were significantly less enthusiastic about the policy than the rest of the 
population.  They were bearing the costs of the policy while society as a whole received the 
benefits in terms of savings in public spending. This suggests that valence considerations to a 
significant extent drive spatial considerations on this issue. 
To underscore this argument while the Beeching Axe was a spatial issue across the 
entire electorate, in constituencies directly affected by the loss of a public service, it was 
more of a valence issue.  The spatial character of the issue was transformed into a valence 
issues when people were faced with the loss of a public service which in an era of limited car 
ownership would have adversely affected some of them. 
More generally the evidence suggests that valence issues typically dominate the 
political agenda in Britain and in other democracies when it comes to explaining electoral 
choice (Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; Clarke, Kornberg and Scotto, 2009; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau 
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and Bélanger, 2011; Clarke and Whitten, 2013; Ho et al., 2013; Whiteley et al., 2013).  
Spatial issues are also important but they tend to be less so compared with valence issues in 
models of voting behaviour.  This discussion leads us to formulate three hypotheses, based on 
spatial and valence theory.  The first which is based on spatial theory is that:  
(1) Opponents of the Beeching Axe are less likely to support the Conservative party 
who introduced it, but not necessarily more likely to support Labour and the Liberals since 
these parties gave no undertaking to change the policy.  
 The Labour position on the cuts was set out in its manifesto for the 1964 general 
election.  It stated that “The Government’s policy of breaking up road and rail freight co-
ordination, of denationalising road haulage and finally of axing rail services under the 
Beeching Plan, have made things worse.” (Labour Party, 1964).  Thus Labour complained 
about the policy, but crucially gave no undertaking to reverse it.  Moreover, after the party 
was elected to government in 1964 it did not change the policy.   As far as the Liberal party 
was concerned it took no position on station closures in its 1964 general election manifesto, 
so opponents of the cuts had no alternative party to turn to if they wanted to support a change 
in the policy. 
 The second hypothesis based on valence theory is that:  
(2) Voters directly affected by the cuts at the local level are less likely to support the 
Conservative party and more likely to support the Labour and Liberal parties since the 
quality of their public services were being reduced. 
 This hypothesis can be regarded as an extension of the ‘reward-punishment’ model of 
economic voting and the mechanism is simply that voters punish an incumbent party for a 
poor performance by switching to a rival (Key, 1968; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Norpoth et al., 
1991, Van der Brug et al., 2007).  Unlike spatial theory, valence theory is not future-
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orientated and does not rely on specific policy commitments to motivate the voters.  Rather it 
focuses on voter’s judgements of the past performance of the parties in relation to all of the 
salient valence issues, including the economy and the quality of public services like transport 
(Whiteley et al., 2013; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Foucault, 2013).  Thus a rival party does not 
have to commit to reversing the Beeching Axe to attract support, merely to appear to be a 
better overall alternative at delivering what the voters want, which would include reversing 
the cuts for many of those directly affected by them.   
 The third hypothesis links spatial and valence issue perceptions and provides a 
theoretical grounding for spatial attitudes to this issue, which as the earlier discussion 
indicates are not explained in the spatial model:  
(3) Spatial attitudes to the Beeching Axe are driven, in part, by valence attitudes to the cuts 
among those directly affected by them. 
There is a long established distinction in this literature between egocentric and 
sociotropic evaluations of policy performance (Kinder and Kieweit, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 
1988).  The former relates to voter judgements about their own personal financial 
circumstances and the latter to their evaluations of the state of the national economy. The 
mechanism at play here are egocentric evaluations of the losses associated with the Beeching 
cuts experienced by individuals living in locations affected by the plan.  Our hypothesis is 
that egocentric valence evaluations of the cuts drive spatial evaluations of the issue but the 
latter are also influenced by parties and leaders (see Sanders et al., 2011).  Thus the personal 
circumstances of individual voters are the source of attitudes to this issue, but the party cues 
acting as heuristics allow voters to make spatial judgements about the policy, which is 
particularly important for those unaffected by the cuts. 
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In the next section we examine the specification of a voting model to test these 
hypotheses.  
Data and Methods 
In this section we present the data and the empirical strategy to investigate the impact of the 
Beeching Axe. For robustness purposes, we proceed in two steps. First, we explore the effect 
of the cuts at the individual level by modelling voting intentions in 1963 (Butler and Stokes, 
1969). Second, we explore the effect of the closures at the aggregate level by modelling party 
vote share by constituencies in the General Election of 1964.  These two approaches share 
two key independent variables— attitudes to Beeching plan and the number of stations closed 
in each constituency where the respondent lives. The following paragraphs describe how we 
used data on the geographic location of the station closures to create the latter variable, and 
discuss the exogenous character of the station closures. 
 The data collection involved using a list of 1,927 closures as reported in ‘Section 5, 
Passenger Stations and Halts to be Closed,’ of The Reshaping of British Railways (British 
Railways Board, 1963). The closures took place across Britain as a whole but the paper 
focuses on England and Wales because there is a lack of data for predictor variables in 
Scotland during this period.  The report only identifies the name of the stations to be closed 
and lacks information about the stations’ specific location.  To overcome this problem, each 
station closure was assigned geographically to the town it served, and subsequently the 
closure/town was assigned to a constituency.2  The dataset used for estimation consists of 498 
constituencies with their respective number of station closures.  The total number of closures 
in the dataset for England and Wales was 1,053.  This is captured by the variable Closed 
Stations, which has a mean of 2.11 and a variance of 13.1.  
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 The fact that models of electoral behaviour involve complex reciprocal relationships 
has been a key theme in recent research on economic voting (Nannestand and Paldam, 1994; 
Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fraile and Lewis-Beck, 2014).  This might lead to endogeneity, 
which in turn causes biased estimates (Greene, 2003). We argue that station closures were 
clearly exogenous to voting intentions, and this is true for a number of reasons.  Firstly, 
evidence from the 1963 British Election Study survey shows that 46.3 per cent of 
Conservative voters lived in constituencies unaffected by station closures as did 46.5 per cent 
of Labour voters and 45.2 per cent of Liberals.  Clearly, if station closures had been 
influenced by political considerations then the government would have ensured that Labour 
and Liberal constituencies were disproportionately affected by them and their own 
constituencies protected.  
 However, there is a counter argument to this which states that station closures could 
be endogenous in marginal constituencies if not in all constituencies (Ward, 1998; Ward and 
John, 1999, 2001; McGillivray, 2004). If this is correct, then the Conservative government in 
1964 would have closed fewer stations in its own marginal seats and even fewer stations in 
the marginal seats held by Labour on the grounds that the latter were electoral targets. An 
empirical analysis of the number of station closures presented in our supplementary materials 
shows that marginality did not influence closures, even when different definitions of 
marginality are taken into consideration. 
 Based on this, we take the closure of stations as a natural experiment at the 
constituency level. Applied empirical research often explores these natural experiments with 
well-known difference-in-difference (DD) models (see Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; 
Scheve and Stasavage, 2012). These models are identified by the parallel trends assumption, 
which simply states that in the absence of the treatment (e.g. a station closure), the expected 
values of the dependent variable across control and treatment groups would follow parallel 
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trends over time. In the section that covers the aggregate analysis of vote share, we show that 
the parallel trends assumption is adequately met, which provides additional support to our 
claim of exogenous station closures. 
Individual-level Analysis: Voting Intentions in 1963 
The 1963 BES survey was in the field a year before the general election and it included a 
question about public attitudes to the Beeching cuts (Butler and Stokes, 1969).  This is the 
only survey in the history of the BES that explored this issue and therefore it gives us a 
unique opportunity to explore the effect of the cuts on voting intentions.  
 There is evidence of partisan influences on attitudes to the cuts with 57 per cent of 
Conservative identifiers supporting the cuts (29 per cent opposed) and 37 per cent of Labour 
identifiers supporting them (41 per cent opposed).  The Liberal identifiers were rather like the 
Conservatives with 51 per cent supporting and 31 per cent opposing.  This suggests that 
Conservatives were more likely to support their government on this issue.  Clearly, in 
modelling the relationship between attitudes to the cuts and voting intentions, it is necessary 
to control for the partisan attachments of respondents.3    
 It is also necessary to control for public evaluations of the three key political leaders, 
Harold Macmillan, the Conservative Prime Minister; Harold Wilson, the Labour leader; and 
Joe Grimond, the Liberal leader. The leadership scores consisted of the number of positive 
traits cited minus the number of negative traits in response to questions about these leaders. 
Summary statistics of the control variables are included in our supplementary materials.  
Partisan attachments and leader images primarily play the role of affect heuristics in the 
valence model.4  Voters have few incentives to invest time and effort in learning the details of 
the policies proposed by the political parties, and at the same time they recognise their 
limitations in obtaining and processing relevant information about issues.  Accordingly, they 
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use cognitive and affective shortcuts in decision-making (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, Brody, 
and Tetlock, 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin, 2000).   
 Paul Slovic and his collaborators introduced the idea of an ‘affect’ heuristic, arguing 
that emotional responses occur ‘rapidly and automatically’ in decision-making (2007: 1333).  
This makes them a lot easier to process than cognitive judgements about the content, 
credibility and effectiveness of policy promises (see also Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen. 
2000). Similarly Gigerenzer suggests that a ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic which voters can use 
for judging political parties is to evaluate the honesty, competence and likeability of their 
leaders (Gigerenzer, 2008).   If a leader appears to have such positive traits then it suggests 
that his party is likely to deliver positive outcomes.  Similarly voters can ask themselves if 
they think a party has done a good job or a bad job in delivering valence issues in the past.  
This is the underling driver of partisanship, which can be seen as a ‘running tally’ of 
retrospective evaluations of party performance with more distant performances being 
discounted in comparison with the more recent ones (see Fiorina, 1981). 
The survey of 1963 describes voting intentions of respondents and shows that Labour 
was comfortably ahead at the time with just over 45 per cent of vote intentions compared 
with the Conservative’s 33 per cent, and the Liberals 13 per cent.  As mentioned earlier, this 
was a bad year politically for the Conservatives with the Profumo scandal hitting the 
headlines, the Prime Minister facing illness which prompted him to step down in October, 
and a general feeling among the public that after thirteen years in power the Conservative 
government had run out of steam (see Butler and King, 1965).  Voting intentions are the 
dependent variable in the subsequent modelling. 
 In addition to attitudes to the Beeching cuts other issue perceptions were included in 
the modelling.  Firstly, respondents were asked an open ended question about which issue 
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facing the country was most important to them.  Dummy variables were subsequently created 
to measure which party the respondent thought was most likely to solve this issue.  These 
issues were quite diverse, but tended to focus on valence or performance questions.  The key 
valence variable relating to economic evaluations was measured using a question about the 
effects of the government’s handling of the economy over the previous year on their own 
financial circumstances, making it an egocentric economic evaluations variable (Kinder and 
Kiewiet, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983; Fraile and Lewis-Beck, 2014). 
Table 1 contains the multinomial logistic regressions of the vote intention models for 
the Conservatives, Labour and Liberals with non-voters being the reference category.  Table 
1 shows clearly that opposition to the Beeching cuts among the public reduced support for the 
Conservatives, controlling for all the other variables.  At the same time such opposition did 
not appear to influence Labour or Liberal voting intentions.   This is consistent with the idea 
that the Conservatives were punished by the electorate for their position on this spatial issue 
but the Opposition parties were not rewarded since as we pointed out earlier, they did not 
commit to reversing the cuts.  This evidence supports hypothesis (1). 
 In relation to the number of stations closed in constituencies, this variable had a 
positive impact on Labour and Liberal voting which is consistent with hypothesis (2), 
indicating that those directly affected were more likely to switch to another party even if it 
did not formally commit to changing the policy.  This is a standard retrospective egocentric 
response to a policy change in the valence model and involves considerable less effort than is 
required in the spatial model which involves voters evaluating the credibility of future policy 
commitments by rival parties.  Further exploration of any interactions between station 
closures and attitudes to the cuts revealed no significant non-linear interactions between these 
measures.5 
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 The other variables in the models behaved largely as expected.  If a respondent chose 
a party as the best one for handling their most important issue, that boosted support for that 
party.  In the case of the Conservative model the belief that the party could best deal with the 
respondent’s most important issue increased support for the party, but a belief that Labour 
could best do this reduced support.  For the other parties this belief boosted support for the 
party concerned, but it did not appear to affect support for the other parties.   
Table 1: Multinomial Model of Vote Intentions in 1963. 
Predictors Conservatives Labour Liberal 
Conservatives Most Important Issue 
 
0.67* 
(0.38) 
-0.90* 
(0.51) 
0.41 
(0.48) 
Labour Most Important Issue 
 
0.40 
(0.33) 
1.23*** 
(0.27) 
0.31 
(0.36) 
Liberals Most Important Issue 
 
0.17 
(0.79) 
1.12 
(0.76) 
   2.93*** 
(0.68) 
Conservative Partisanship 
 
    1.71*** 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.29 
(0.21) 
Labour Partisanship 
 
-0.01 
(0.24) 
1.56*** 
(0.16) 
0.09 
(0.24) 
Liberal Partisanship 
 
          0.34 
(0.30) 
-1.23** 
(0.59) 
   1.66*** 
(0.24) 
Personal Retrospective Economic 
Evaluations 
0.35** 
(0.18) 
0.31* 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.20) 
Evaluations of Macmillan 
 
     0.22** 
(0.09) 
-0.11 
(1.1) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
Evaluations of Wilson 
 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
Evaluations of Grimond 
 
0.00 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
Oppose Beeching Cuts 
 
 -0.30** 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.16) 
Number of Stations Closed in 
Constituency 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
Male 
 
-0.44 
(0.27) 
-0.17 
(0.25) 
-0.54* 
(0.30) 
Age 
 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Education  
 
0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
0.13 
(0.12) 
Income 
 
 0.10** 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
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Constant -2.00** 
(0.84) 
-0.71 
(0.81) 
-1.05 
(0.93) 
Log-likelihood  -767.73  
Pseudo R Square 
 
 0.60  
Source: British Election Study 1963 survey, N=1595, standard errors in parenthesis. 
   
 This was a period during which partisan attachments in the electorate were very 
strong (Butler and Stokes, 1969), and the partisanship variables had the biggest impacts on 
voting intentions in the modelling.  Conservative partisanship had a highly significant impact 
on Conservative vote intentions but no impact on Labour or Liberal vote intentions.  Labour 
partisanship had a similar effect in influencing votes for the party, but not for the others.  
Liberal partisanship was the exception, since in this case it had a positive impact on Liberal 
voting intentions and a negative impact on Labour vote intentions.  This suggests that party 
competition between the Liberals and Labour was quite strong at the time.   
 In relation to leadership evaluations, positive scores for Harold Macmillan boosted 
support for the Conservatives and positive scores for Harold Wilson did the same for Labour.  
In contrast positive scores for the Liberal leader, Joe Grimond had no influence of voting for 
any of the parties.  Equally, there was no evidence that positive scores for the Conservative 
leader influenced Labour voting or that scores for the Labour leader influenced Conservative 
voting.  The signs on the rival party coefficients were generally negative even though they 
were not significant, and so this is consistent with the idea that a popular rival party leader 
had the potential to reduce support for a party.   
 Hypothesis (3) implies that the number of stations closed in each constituency was 
clearly exogenous to vote intentions when the other controls are in place.  The distribution of 
station closures indicates that almost 53 per cent of respondents lived in constituencies 
affected by the cuts.  Indeed some 3 per cent of them lived in constituencies where a total of 
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12 stations were closed, making the effects at the local level considerable.  The latter were 
largely rural constituencies spread over a wide area, but overall the closures had the potential 
to make life more difficult for many people at a time when car ownership was much more 
limited than it is today.  
Table 2: Ordered Logit Model of Attitudes to the Beeching Cuts 1963. 
Predictors Estimates 
Number of Stations Closed in Constituency    0.04** 
(0.02) 
Conservative Partisanship 
 
    -0.12*** 
(0.06) 
Labour Partisanship 
 
0.16*** 
(0.05) 
Liberal Partisanship 
 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
Personal Retrospective Economic Evaluations -0.10 
(0.07) 
Evaluations of Macmillan 
 
    -0.12*** 
(0.04) 
Evaluations of Wilson 
 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
Evaluations of Grimond 
 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
Male 
 
-0.81*** 
(0.11) 
Education 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Age 
 
0.01* 
(0.003) 
Income 
 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
Pseudo R Square 
 
0.07 
Note: Data is clustered by constituencies with robust standard errors, standard errors in 
parenthesis. The coding of the dependent variable is 1 = support the cuts; 2 = mixed attitudes 
or don’t know; 3 = oppose the cuts. 
  
We test hypothesis (3) by estimating an ordered logit model of attitudes to the cuts 
using the Beeching variable, which is a predictor in Table 1.  The specification includes the 
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number of stations closed in the respondent’s constituency together with controls for party 
and leadership cues.  The results of this exercise appear in Table 2, which shows that the 
number of stations closed has an independent effect on attitudes to the cuts, controlling for 
everything else.  The more stations closed in a respondent’s constituency the greater the 
probability that they opposed the cuts.  The control variables show that Conservative 
partisans and voters with positive evaluations of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan were 
more likely to support cuts, whereas Labour partisans were less likely to do so.  Interestingly 
enough evaluations of the Labour leader, Harold Wilson, did not influence attitudes to the 
cuts, whereas evaluations of the Liberal leader did, with his supporters more likely to support 
cuts.  In addition, males, the highly educated and the affluent were more likely to support 
cuts, but older voters were less likely to do so.  At that time the affluent and educated were 
more likely to have access to cars and therefore less likely to feel the impact of the cuts at the 
local level. These results are consistent with hypothesis (3). 
Aggregate Analysis: Party Vote Shares in the General Election of 1964 
In this section we explore party vote shares in British constituencies for the 1964 General 
Election. Constituency covariates have frequently been used for modelling voting behaviour 
at the aggregate level (Berrington, 1965; Cain, 1978; Miller, 1978; Johnston, 1981; 
McAllister and Studlar, 1992; Rossiter, Johnston, and Pattie, 1997a, 1997b). There is, 
however, something of a problem measuring such covariates in 1964 because of the lack of 
data.  In order to overcome this obstacle, we obtained covariates for Local Government 
Districts (LGD), found their geographical centroids, and then assigned them to 
constituencies.  In the early 1960s there were some 1,300 local government districts in 
England and Wales. Using the procedure just described, the paper assigned 1,275 LGDs to 
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their respective constituencies.  When constituencies consisted of several LGDs, we took the 
mean value of the variables.6  
The vote share of the Conservative party is the dependent variable, and the key 
independent variable is the number of stations closed by constituency. Our dataset consists of 
498 constituencies with their respective number of station closures, although data availability 
reduced estimation samples to 418 constituencies for the 1964 election. 
 We control for several covariates suggested in this literature.  In particular, we 
consider the variables used in Berrington’s empirical study of the 1964 election (1965). First, 
we account for different occupational groups; the variable (Boss) is the percentage of males 
in groups 1 and 2, that is, employers and managers in large and small establishments. In order 
to account for the potential effect of the abolition of Retail Price Maintenance, we also 
estimate the models with a breakdown of the variable Boss. The variable (Boss Large) is the 
percentage of males in group 1: employers and managers in large establishments. The 
variable (Boss Small) is the percentage of males in group 2: employers and managers in small 
establishments. According to Miller (1978), the proportion of employers and managers is an 
excellent predictor of vote choice at the constituency level. The variable (Professional) is the 
percentage of males in groups 3 and 4: professional workers self-employed and employed 
requiring a university degree. The variable (Workers) is the percentage of males in groups 5 
to 11 and 15: manual and non-manual workers, including agricultural workers. The variable 
(Farmers) is the percentage of males in groups 13 and 14: employers and managers in farms. 
 Following Berrington’s analysis of the 1964 election, we also control for the 
marginality of constituencies (Marginal), which is a dummy variable scoring one if the 
Conservative majority over Labour was 12 per cent or less of the two-party vote in 1959 or if 
the Labour majority over the Conservatives was 8 per cent or less of the two-party vote in 
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1959.7  Additionally, we account for the effect of (Region); we divide England and Wales 
into nine regions: London, the South East, the South West, the Midlands, the East, the North 
West, the North, York, and Wales. Each region is a dummy variable. The omitted category is 
the North West.  
 Berrington (1965) also argues that the movement of population may also determine 
political support. Hence, the model includes variables designed to capture this; (Expanding) 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the electorate in a constituency grew by 10 per cent or 
more between 1959 and 1964, otherwise it is coded as zero.  (Declining) is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the electorate in a constituency declined by 10 per cent or more between 1959 
and 1964, otherwise zero.8 Overcrowding is captured by the percentage of persons living at 
more than 1.5 persons per room (Housing). A measure of poverty at the local level is 
provided by the variable (Premature Deaths), which is the infant mortality rate for babies 
under 4 weeks of age relative to all births in 1964.  We also control for (ln(Population)), 
which is the natural logarithm plus one of total population.9 Summary statistics are included 
in the paper’s supplementary materials. 
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Table 3: Conservative Share of the Vote in 1964. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Share 1959 
Share 
1959 
Share 
1964 
Share 
1964 
Share 
1964 
Share 
1964 
Treatment 
Dummy 50 -0.022  -0.002    
             (0.01)  (0.01)    
Closed 
Stations  -0.002  -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
              (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Marginal       0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
               (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Boss           0.488** 0.506** 0.506**  
               (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)  
Professiona
l   -0.778** -0.829** -0.829*** -0.514 
               (0.32) (0.35) (0.31) (0.34) 
Workers        -0.728*** -0.728*** -0.728*** -0.691*** 
               (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Farmers        -0.304 -0.154 -0.154 -0.131 
               (0.22) (0.20) (0.26) (0.25) 
Premature 
Deaths   -1.164 -1.276 -1.276 -1.108 
               (1.06) (1.01) (1.06) (1.03) 
ln(Populati
on)   0.013 0.012** 0.012 0.013 
               (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Housing        -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
               (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Expanding      0.034*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
               (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Declining      0.054 0.055* 0.055 0.054 
               (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
London         -0.046*** -0.045** -0.045*** -0.050*** 
               (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
South East   0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
               (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
South West   -0.040** -0.035* -0.035** -0.037** 
               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Midlands       0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 
               (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
East           -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 -0.023 
               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
North          0.008 0.012 0.012 0.014 
               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
York           -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 
	24	
	
               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Wales          -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.132*** 
               (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Boss Large      -0.104 
                  (0.41) 
Boss Small      0.838*** 
                  (0.27) 
Intercept    0.501*** 0.494*** 0.881*** 0.888*** 0.888*** 0.846*** 
             (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Observatio
ns            496 496 418 418 418 418 
R2 0.007 0.003 0.533 0.537 0.537 0.540 
Clusters     59 59 59  59 59 
Unit: Electoral district. DV: Conservative Share of the Vote. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3 contains linear regression models of the Conservative vote at the constituency level 
in both 1959 and 1964. All models have standard errors clustered on the county, with the 
exception of model 4.  Model 1 addresses the issue of parallel trends discussed earlier; it 
presents a placebo regression where the Conservative share of the votes in the election in 
1959 (Conservative Share 1959) depends on a treatment variable (Treatment Dummy 50).  
Recall that the 1,053 stations were closed in England and Wales. The mean number of 
closures by constituency is 2.11, with a variance of 13.1, and a median of 1.0; 250 
constituencies experienced at least one station closure while 248 experienced none. The 
variable Treatment Dummy 50 is equal to one if the number of station closures in a 
constituency is larger or equal than the median number of station closures. Otherwise, it is 
equal to zero.10  If the parallel trends assumption holds, station closures should not determine 
vote shares in 1959—if they do, it could be the case that closures were implemented in 
particular constituencies possibly for political reasons. However, it can be seen that, not 
surprisingly, the closures did not have an effect on the Conservative vote share in the 1959 
general election.  
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Model 2 in Table 3 presents another placebo regression where Conservative Share 
1959 depends on the variable Closed Stations, which is the actual number of closures by 
constituency. If the parallel trends assumption is met, the effect of these treatment variables 
on the Conservative share of the votes in 1959 should also be zero, as described above.   The 
estimates in Table 3 show that the assumption holds for both the treatment dummy and the 
number of closed stations—both variables are statistically equal to zero when the dependent 
variable is the Conservative vote share in 1959.  This further justifies regarding the Beeching 
cuts as an exogenous intervention in British politics. 
 Model 3 in Table 3 uses the Conservative share of the votes in 1964 as the dependent 
variable and includes all the predictors described earlier.  However, instead of using the 
number of closures of models 4-6, it uses the variable Treatment Dummy 50 of model 1. 
Models 4 to 6 explore the effect of the number of closures. Models 4 and 5 share the same 
specification, but the former does not cluster the standard errors on the county. Model 6 
breaks down the variable Boss into the variables Boss Large and Boss Small as described 
before in order to account for the potential effect of the abolition of Retail Price Maintenance. 
Although the estimates show that the dummy variable version of station closures does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the Conservative share of the vote in 1964, the 
estimates for the effect of the number of closures clearly and consistently show that the 
electorate punished the incumbent government for the implementation of the policy, as we 
predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2.11  
 In a simulation of the Conservative share of the vote in 1964 according to Model 5 in 
a non-marginal constituency in the South East where all continuous covariates are held at 
their mean, we find that for zero closures the vote share is .448 with a standard error of .008 
while for five closures the share is reduced to .435 with a standard error of .009. In other 
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words, five closed stations reduce the Conservative share of the vote by approximately one 
per cent at the constituency level, all else equal. Although this difference may seem relatively 
small —nine constituencies were won by Labour by a margin below one per cent— the fact is 
that this was one of the closest elections in post-war Britain: the 1964 election gave Labour 
317 seats, only 13 more seats than the Conservatives obtained. In this close electoral battle, 
the Beeching Cuts made a crucial difference. 
To further illustrate the effect of the closures, consider the constituencies of Derby 
North and Wolverhampton South East in the Midlands. Both constituencies were marginal 
seats, had similar population size, and comparable rates of Conservative support in a Labour 
stronghold area.12  Five stations were closed in Derby North while only one was closed in 
Wolverhampton South East.  While Conservative support in Wolverhampton South East 
remained relatively constant between 1959 and 1964, the Conservative share of the vote in 
Derby North dropped from 47.2 per cent in 1959 to 34.6 per cent.  In line with our argument, 
this indicates that the closures had a serious negative effect on Conservative support. 
Conclusions 
This paper shows that a one-off intervention in transport policies known as the Beeching Axe 
had a significant impact on voting intentions and also on the outcome of the 1964 General 
Election in Britain.  The empirical tests show that this intervention was not influenced by 
political considerations at the time, other than the desire of the then incumbent Conservative 
government to save money by reducing the size of the railway network.  Thus the cuts can be 
regarded as an exogenous intervention in the political process. As mentioned before, there is 
a problem identifying if variations in policy delivery drive electoral support, or if the process 
works in reverse, with anticipated electoral effects driving policy-making. In this light, the 
exogenous stations closures help us to identify the effect of policy implementation on voting 
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behaviour; this is a technique that has proven to be very helpful in understanding, for 
instance, retrospective voting (e.g. Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011; Gasper and Reeves 2011).  
 The issue of transport policies is usually not very salient in elections which tend to be 
dominated by the big domestic issues of the economy, health care and immigration (Clarke et 
al., 2004; 2009).  But such was the magnitude and timing of the cuts that they directly 
influenced the outcome of the general election at that time.  Given that the 1964 general 
election was very close, producing a Labour government with a majority of only four seats, 
arguably the Beeching cuts were a key factor explaining the end of a Conservative 
government that had lasted since 1951.  The Conservative government was clearly very 
unwise implementing such large scale changes to transport in Britain just prior to a general 
election. 
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1 The Report closed both individual stations and entire train lines. The closure of an entire 
line is more severe. However, the paper focuses on station closures because they can be  
easily assigned to parliamentary constituencies while train lines present a methodological 
problem of a different magnitude. 
2 Assigning closed train stations to constituencies is easy if there is a computer shapefile with 
the digitized boundaries of the seats. Unfortunately, the oldest digitized boundary files are 
available only for the boundaries of Scotland and Wales in 1981, and the boundaries of 
England in 1983. Hence, we assigned the closures to the constituencies in Wales in 1981 and 
England in 1983. These Welsh and English constituencies were then matched to their 
respective 1964 constituencies with a list provided by D. F. L. Dorling in his study of British 
General Election Results, 1955-1992 (1993). The shapefiles were obtained from the 1981 
Census Boundary Derived Datasets: “This work is based on data provided through EDINA 
UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC and uses boundary material which is 
copyright of the Crown.”  
3 In relation to the partisanship variables, the highest score went to strong partisans and the 
lowest to weak partisans in a three category measure.   
4 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a clarification on affect 
heuristics. 
5 We tested an interaction in the model between attitudes to the Beeching Axe and the 
number of stations closed and no significant effects were identified.  Note that this was 
estimated by incorporating the full interaction effects based on the cross-partial derivative of 
the expected vale of the dependent variable and not just the marginal effect of the interaction 
term (See Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004).  
	36	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
6 The means of the variables are not weighted. However, we replicated our main analyses 
presented in Table 3 using the weighted means of the variables and found even stronger 
evidence in favour of our hypotheses. These additional estimation results are presented in our 
Supplementary Material. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
7 This may be an arbitrary definition of marginality, but since this is the definition used by the 
only empirical study of the 1964 election, we also use it for consistency purposes. However, 
we replicated our main analyses of Table 3 using four additional definitions of marginality 
based on different cut points as well as on the absolute value and squared difference in votes 
in the two party vote (Clarke et al. 2004).  Our substantive results remain unchanged. We 
would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. In addition, our analyses of 
the exogeneity of the cuts in our Supplementary Material use alternative definitions of 
marginality and results remained unchanged there as well. We do not include Conservative 
share of the vote for 1959 to avoid problems of non-stationarity and solutions that might 
distract attention from our interest on the effect of the cuts. 
8 The definition of an expanding electorate was taken from Berrington’s analysis (1965), 
which was also applied to a declining electorate. However, we replicated our main analyses 
of Table 3 using a stricter different definition of expanding and declining electorates and our 
substantive results about station closures remained unchanged. We would like to thank an 
anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.	
9 The variables on occupation were obtained from the Socio-Economic Group Statistics from 
the 1961 Census, Table: SOC\_1961\_EW. The variables on housing were obtained from the 
Housing Statistics (persons per room) from the 1961 Census, Table: HOUS\_1961\_EW. The 
variables on mortality were obtained from the Annual Birth and Death Statistics for Local 
Government Districts in England and Wales, 1911-74, year 1964, Table: MORT\_LGD. 
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These tables are available at the Great Britain Historical Database (GBH DB), and they are 
located at the Historical Censuses Collections (CHCC) in the History Data Service (HDS).  
10 The paper tested for the effect of other treatment dummy variables on the Conservative 
share of the vote in 1959. These alternative treatment dummy variables have thresholds set at 
the 75th, 90th, and the 95th percentile of the number of closed stations. The parallel trends 
assumption is also met with these treatment variables. 
11 It is interesting that the closure of stations as a dummy variable does not have an effect on 
vote share. The paper also tested different versions of Model 3 using alternative treatment 
dummy variables with thresholds set at the 75th, 90th, and the 95th percentile of the number of 
closed stations. None of these dummy variables had an effect on the Conservative share of 
the vote in 1964. The paper also estimated other versions of Model 5 using different 
functional forms for the number of closed stations, including its natural logarithm and the 
cubic polynomial. These functional forms do not have an effect on the Conservative share of 
the vote. The effect only takes place when the count variable of stations is used. This effect is 
always significant.  It is also important to note that results not presented here but available in 
the computer code available for replication, show that station closures reduce the 
Conservative share of the vote even when the two constituencies with the largest number of 
closures are dropped from the analysis. These are Devon West and Torridge, and Cornwall 
North with 20 and 19 closed stations respectively. 
12 Derby North had a population of 32,425 and a boss rate (i.e. employers and managers in 
large and small establishments) of .05. Wolverhampton South East had a population of 
32,605 and also a boss rate of .05. It is worth noting that the Liberal Party obtained 12.5 per 
cent of the vote share in Derby North, while Labor support remain constant between 1959 
and 1964; this suggests that Conservative votes probably went to the Liberals. 
